On the Future of Internet Governance by Wu, Tim et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2007 
On the Future of Internet Governance 
Tim Wu 
Columbia Law School, twu@law.columbia.edu 
Esther Dyson 
A. Michael Froomkin 
froomkin@law.miami.edu 
David A. Gross 
Grossda@State.gov 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Internet Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tim Wu, Esther Dyson, A. Michael Froomkin & David A. Gross, On the Future of Internet Governance, 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS, VOL. 101, P. 201, 2007 (2007). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1477 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=992805
 
 
COPYRIGHT NOTICE   
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On the Future of Internet Governance 
 
Tim Wu, Professor, Columbia Law School, and moderator  (remarks 
in italics, “T” during questions)  
Esther Dyson, founding Chairman, ICANN (“E”) 
Michael Froomkin, Professor, University of Miami Law School (“M”) 
David Gross, Ambassador, State Department, United States (“D”)  
 
The issues surrounding internet naming and internet governance have 
been controversial since about the mid-1990s.  But public attention was 
drawn to Internet governance in the early 2000s, when Europe and other 
countries declared themselves unhappy with how internet governance was 
working, how the domain names were being assigned and other issues.  
David can you summarize what was happening in the early 2000s that 
created controversy in this area? 
 
D: .  There was in 1998 a proposal for a UN world summit, a summit 
on the information society.  The concept was  how to use new information and 
communications technology to help the world, particularly to support the 
developing world.  And there was a lot of, as you can well imagine in the late 
90s, a lot of enthusiasm for this idea, and although there was a little 
misgiving, everyone, by and large was on board.  The U.S. government had 
some misgivings about it as we generally do with most UN summits, but we 
also came on board.  It was such a popular idea, that they decided to hold it 
not in one place at one time, but rather in two places at two times, but they 
couldn’t decide where to do it.   
 
So, in Geneva in 2003 and then in Tunisia (a place that’s always 
interesting when you’re talking about internet related issues) in 2005.  For 
those of you who are not familiar with a UN summit, all the fun and games 
happen before the summit, not at the summit.  Summits are sort of parties, 
and all of the negotiations happen ahead of time in what’s called preparatory 
meetings, where the world gathers, or at least diplomats from the world 
gather.  One thing that was done differently, something that was really 
unique, was that the private sector, NGOs, private companies were invited in 
some fashion to participate. This was done  because the internet, of course,  
was being driven forward by the private sector.  But, of course governments 
and in particular many diplomats are uncomfortable with that, and so the 
first big fight was on the summits rules of the game.  
 
That’s important because internet governance and the ultimate 
resolution of these things, were driven by, as most things are, by those who 
were able to participate and how they were able to participate as much as by 
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the substance.  And many countries, as you can imagine, I won’t name 
names, but you know who they are, did not want the private sector involved;  
they didn’t want organizations like ICANN or NGOs or the Internet Society 
or others,or commercial companies to be involved.  They just wanted it to be a 
traditional summit amongst foreign ministry types who are usually the last 
to get the memo about what the subject’s  technical aspects are  really about.  
So of course what happens at that point is that everyone falls back on what 
summits generally are all about-- which are rights and discussions about 
rights.  And as a relatively newcomer to this situation, I was very interested 
to see that generally when the discussion  is about rights, those who scream 
loudest for rights are generally those who give the least amount of rights 
away to their own people, so I found it all a somewhat surreal experience 
initially.  
 
But to really answer the question more precisely, there was  certain 
parts of the developing world and particularly those who don’t seem to allow 
their people to speak freely on the internet and otherwise, and to try to take 
ICANN in particular and other parts of the internet away from the private 
sector, and also arguably to take away the role that the US government plays 
uniquely, with regard to this, to some international organization, either by 
changing ICANN itself into an international organization or by subsuming 
the role that ICANN plays into an existing international organization such as 
the International Telecommunications Union or the United Nations or some 
other organization.  The purpose of these efforts , in our view, was to create a 
veto, an effective veto, by those governments who are not very happy with the 
rapid and innovative changes on the internet,  both economically and also 
with regard to speech, by threatening a veto. Let’s just use one country, 
China, just to use one by example, by threatening to veto they could then 
restrict the issues that Michael talked about in terms of the allocation with 
domain names, the New top-level domain names, or some of the underlying 
architecture of the internet and how that would change.   
 
Not surprisingly, we were very upset by that concept, we fought very 
hard.  We won the first round in 2003 largely by pointing out that regularly 
the term “internet governance”, you’ll be pleased to see,  nobody had an 
agreed upon definition.  So, when in doubt, send it to a committee to define it, 
so that’s what we did.  In 2003, the world gathered, heads of states from most 
of the world’s nations gathered together and decided to send this issue to a 
committee. And so we sent the issue to the committee, which then went off to 
form a group of experts to be appointed by the UN.  They came back in late 
2005, and came up with something, which I thought was fairly cockamamie 
on a number of points, some very excellent points regarding other areas , and 
of course it was completely ignored by the diplomats who then negotiated all 
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over again, and they were very, very tense negotiations; lots of late nights in 
many of these “prep-coms.”  
 
Ultimately the result, in my view, was extordinarly positive, which 
was the decision to not change what we had already established, that we 
would instead create a forum for discussion of internet related issues, 
internet governance, where parties could go and have discussions about these 
things, but would that would  be in a non-binding fashion.   
 
And, I will quickly add one last thing that’s often overlooked, in this 
discussion.  I think the good news is that with all of the focus on the internet 
governance, we the U.S. together with very close allies, were able to get the 
paragraph 4 in to the Tunis Declaration, that enshrines the right to free-flow 
of freedom of expression over the internet in an unfettered way.  Where in 
2003, when we had tried to hit it sort of head-on, we ended up restating the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights paragraphs 19 and 29.  So we were 
actually able to get something by  a bit of a misdirection play.  Bottom line, 
no change after the world summit, by the world summit.  
 
In a nutshell: A lot of work, no change. 
 
Esther is there anything that you’d like to add to that? 
 
E:  The saving grace of ICANN as far as I’m concerned is that it’s 
widely considered to be illegitimate, and therefore it has very little power.  If 
it were considered legitimate, and could actually do a lot, with impunity, it 
would be a very dangerous organization. But, as it is, it’s pretty hamstrung 
and nothing much actually happens, which is good.   
 
Nonetheless, I was founding chairman of this organization, and I think 
we made two huge mistakes.  The first was not to be open.  This was actually 
before I showed up, even in how the thing was created and how the initial 
board was selected.  But then we held our board meetings in private for the 
first year or two, which completely destroyed any affection we might have 
had among the people who were supposed to be the people on behalf of whom 
we were developing policies.  That created a very unhappy relationship 
between ICANN itself and the internet community. It  was exacerbated by 
the fact that we were trying to privatize Network Solutions, which owned the 
dot com, dot net and dot org registries.  They behaved extremely badly, which 
made things worse because the U.S. wanted to pretend that we were not 
created by the U.S. and had given us no funding.  We had very little in the 
way of the budget so we had to – in quotes -  “tax the internet.”   
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The second big thing we did - wrong was to impose way too strict and 
precisely defined contracts.  Even now, the terms on which registries and 
registrars can compete are extremely limited; they have to offer pretty much 
the same services for the same prices, with restrictions on almost anything 
creative – including stronger security, privacy services and the like.  Almost 
the only way they can compete is on the basis of sleazy marketing practices.  
 
But  I think that there are many more interesting things to talk about 
than ICANN concerning Internet governance.  For example,  what can be 
done to improve security on the internet? Not by ICANN getting into the 
security regulation business, but by better treaties and understandings of 
liability that would encourage the use of security practices -  primarily by 
consumers and companies, but most likely  implemented by ISPs who would 
be liable for the actions of their customers if they didn’t give properly manage 
their customers’  security or something like that.  Those are the things that 
I’d like to talk about. 
 
Do you want to jump in, Michael? 
 
M:  I just want to say that two things.  The first thing is that if Esther 
had been saying these things when ICANN was founded, we wouldn’t have 
founded ICANN Watch we would have just quoted everything Esther just 
said. 
 
The second thing is, I wish I were as confident that ICANN isn’t 
dangerous.  Nobody’s been tortured, nobody’s been killed; in the grand 
scheme of things it’s really not that bad.  But, the budget has grown a lot, 
and ICANN has gotten rich and a lot of people have gotten rich in dealing 
with ICANN.  And, one does, I think, reasonably worry the critical mass is at 
some point achieved, where Esther was saying, that that which was true 
yesterday might not be true tomorrow. 
 
I want to ask all of you whether you think the current system is in fact 
stable--whether the partnership between ICANN, a California, non-profit 
organization and the United States government, basically on behest of the 
rest of the world, is something that can continue for the foreseeable future or 
whether you think its going to run into serious challenges. 
 
E:  I think that your description misses the fact that the ICANN board, 
whatever its faults, is international.  Part of the huge amount of money 
ICANN spends is in fact spent to be more international, including traipsing 
around the world to hold their meetings in Lisbon, Africa, wherever.  This  is 
a huge expense and it makes the point that being international is not free, 
On the Future of Internet Governance 
 5 
just as being open is not free.   ICANN unfortunately does a much better job 
of being international than of being open.   
 
But, I think it’s stable in a way that an airplane is going through 
heavy weather.  Now, airplanes don’t generally crash in heavy weather: they 
crash when they’re landing or taking off.  ICANN is very definitely in flight; 
it’s moving up and down a fair amount but I think it’s stable.  It’s like nuclear 
deterrence: People are scared to mess with it.  There’s a wonderful poem by 
Hillaire Belloc that says, “Hold tightly to the hand of Nurse, for fear of 
finding something worse.” 
 
D:  That has always been ICANN’s best argument for its existence.  I 
think I see three things which threaten that stability and none that’s the 
obvious killer right now.  The first is that there are some new technologies 
being talked about , which could affect the technological assumptions on 
which ICANN is based.  One of them is, some countries, particularly China, 
are looking at setting systems of regulating their internal DNS, which if 
replicated could sort of upset what we call now the stability.  It might not, 
but I think that some people want to prioritize traffic. 
 
E:  But it’s not actually the technology.  China could make the decision 
now with no new technology to really cut themselves off.  It would really hurt 
China even more than it would hurt the rest of the world, but  they have 
enough people that they might just think they should do it.  
 
M:  The other thing is that there are some talks about just redesigning 
the internet from scratch to achieve some ends, whether it be to achieve 
security or prioritizing traffic for movies and so on, which could use the DNS 
we have, or could be an excuse to flip the switch and do something radically 
different, and there’s some real money behind these efforts because of the 
movie delivery aspect.  So, it’s really quite a serious thing, especially in the 
last six months, I think, there’s a lot more hard work going in to try to figure 
out what that would look like.  They’re not talking to me at least, and I’m not 
sure that they’re talking to themselves about the DNS part of the problem 
yet.  So, we don’t know what they’re going to do, but that’s something that 
could be de-stabilizing. 
 
The second is the ambassador’s subject, which is that there are a lot of 
countries out there which, for reasons of pride or policy, are just not 
comfortable with the U.S. having a preemptive role therefore are open to the 
suggestion that something else --  it’s not quite clear what, but something 
else -- really ought to be a better answer.  And that is a source of great 
instability when combined with the third thing, which is that many people in 
the ICANN structure, on the board and in the incumbents who have become 
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quite wealthy off the relationships that they have with it, would really like 
UDI.  They want ICANN to be separate because that locks in their victories 
and takes them out of accountability mechanisms that at least exist 
theoretically now. 
 
What do you mean by UDI? 
 
M:  Unilateral Declaration of Independence.  They want ICANN to not 
be tied to the regular stewardship of any particular country, they disagree 
amongst themselves about what the best alternative is, and the Ambassador 
deals with this everyday so he can speak better than I can about this. 
 
E: Can I just say one thing more? Something which has always been a 
check on ICANN is that it’s not illegal to run an alternate DNS.  People tried 
to do that, but they didn’t succeed in the market place. They were mostly 
crackpots, but not all. You can still do that and it’s still not against the law to 
create an alternative.  So, the issue isn’t so much technology;  it’s simply. Do 
you have something compelling to offer?  I’m sure we’ll see some of those, 
whether it’s a  country or a TV network or My Space.  It will have its own 
internal namespace inside.  If that thing grows very large, it could get 
interesting… 
 
Why do you think we don’t see any serious alternatives? 
 
E:  Because the DNS is actually pretty convenient.  The problem is 
that the open internet now is getting really scuzzy. I think the first thing 
you’re likely to see is some kind of  VPN or a dot fin, a secure financial 
network.  Certainly the U.S. government has its own black networks behind 
the internet either completely behind it or running over it in the dark.  There 
is  more and more of that,  but you’re not seeing it when you’re on the DNS, 
except you might see some black matter somewhere. 
 
Coming back to you, Ambassador Gross.   There are people out there 
who say that this is crazy; we have the international global resource, the 
internet, the medium of the future, and low and behold there’s one country 
that’s running it  for the rest of the world. How can it possible be a lasting 
system to have  the United States essentially running a global resource for 
the entire world and what possible legitimacy does the United States have in 
this area?  Why not give the authority to the United Nations, why not give it 
to the ITU? 
  
D:  Let me sort of take that in a couple ways.  One there is clearly 
anxiety, and very understandable anxiety about the role of the U.S. 
government, with regard to ICANN and other media issues.  It’s a very 
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legitimate source of anxiety.  If I were a government official of another 
country, I think I too would be very anxious about that.  And I think that 
everyone recognizes the origins and the history and so forth.  But one of the 
things that  became very interesting to me is that, and this not was 
intuitively obvious as when I first started looking at these issues, is that 
there is no doubt large numbers of countries, of which I put many in Europe, 
virtually all of Africa, and many in Asia, would say that , unless an 
international treaty-based organization, like the United Nations, ITU or 
something else, unless such an organization plays some role with regard to 
any type of international activity, then there is a serious question about it’s 
legitimacy.  And so at its core, it’s a way in which we think about it.  
 
I think that’s interesting because if you were to walk down the street 
and ask 100 Americans what they think about this, I would say about 99% 
would look at you like you’re crazy. Why an international organization makes 
what I do legitimate or illegitimate is strange for Americans, who, I think, 
are less concerned about that issue.  So we have to recognize that for the rest 
of the world, that is an important role for international organizations and 
that is what animated part of the discussion at the world summit.  In 
discussing with government officials, it’s interesting, almost all of them 
would say that having a role for the ITU or the UN or some other 
international organization or changing ICANN into some treaty based 
organization would be a source of legitimacy.  However,  the other extreme is 
that they are most fearful is that if no government were to  play a role 
regarding the Internet. And I think this is what animates a lot of the concern.   
 
The other side of ICANN is that the only thing that scares 
governments more than their particular government having some sort of 
control is if no government has control over something that affects their 
peoples’ lives.  And one of the examples I use is the Brazilians. In their 
interventions, for example, Brazil raised a very legitimate and serious issue.  
Their question, was , “we, the Brazilian government, rely tremendously on 
the internet.  We basically use it for tax purposes; we do it for our 
government services.  When and if the internet goes down, if we have some 
catastrophic event, are your citizens  going to look to us, the Brasília 
government, to be responsible for fixing this problem, and to whom do we go? 
Do we go to some international organization? We know how to go to the UN.  
Or, on the other extreme, do we go to some California, not-for-profit company 
and say ‘What’s up? What are we supposed to do?’”  
 
That’s not a role that very many governments are comfortable with.  
Which means that if they couldn’t win the argument to go all the way to a 
multi-lateral organization, virtually every country is comfortable with having 
at least one government, namely the US government, having a role.  They 
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know how to come to us, they know how to deal  with us, even if they don’t 
like us. And, the old analogy, they have a number to call and they know that 
someone’s going to answer that call and try to deal with those issues.  And in 
fact the irony is that countries are in fact more comfortable with the US 
government involvement then no government involvement. 
 
E:  I just want to raise another irony:  Governments are actually a very 
small part of the world, even though they putatively control most of it.   But, 
in fact the real constituency of ICANN is the users, all around the world, 
many of whom are treated shabbily by their own governments, censored, 
ignored…  You go to these international meetings and you see people who 
tend to be the cousins of important ministers living very nicely in expensive 
hotels in Geneva, spending days and days and days on useless meetings.  
They’re not doing any real harm,  but they’re sucking resources out of the 
treasuries of those countries.  That’s why I find a lot of this obsession with 
ICANN offensive:  Not because anything’s doing anything evil but because 
they’re wasting not just money but talent that could be better applied. 
 
M:  ICANN published a consultive paper sometime within the last 48 
hours, which raises officially for the first time, an idea that’s been muttered 
for about a year or more.  That ICANN’s identity should be changed to that 
what they call a private, international organization based in the US, which I 
took to mean something like the International Olympic Committee.  I was 
just wondering if you’re saying that that’s a non-starter for many 
governments. 
 
D:  Yeah, I haven’t studied that. I don’t know enough to be 
knowledgeable to answer the question, but if it is as you say, a way in which 
governments don’t play a role, including the US government and the like, I 
think that would be a very unsatisfactory.  In fact I will say that one of the 
most interesting pieces for me, from a legal perspective on this, and it shows 
you how uncomfortable governments are, is there has been this constant 
search within ICANN to figure out what is the role for governments.  What is 
the appropriate role in this sort of unusual structure? And so far that has 
been defined as something called the GAC, which is the Government 
Advisory Committee, for whom the roles are defined but not, and I think 
everyone would agree, in a way that makes people comfortable.  And 
governments are extraordinarily uncomfortable.  And I think the French are 
leaders, at least in my conversations, of pointing out the irony here because 
governments are very used to having private NGOs or companies that give 
advice to governments and governments decide what to do. Governments are 
extraordinarily uncomfortable in fact, are completely perplexed by the fact 
that they would give non-binding advice to some private entity—that’s just 
something that government officials don’t normally do. 
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M:  It looks awful binding from out here when they give it. 
 
D:  Well in fact that’s part of the tension is, I think its fair to say, that 
ICANN doesn’t really know itself how to deal with that.  And therein lies 
some of the problems.  One other piece, Tim, that Michael raises too, one.  We 
were driven, from a policy perspective, to say that the current system of the 
internet is not the end-all be-all.  And we are convinced that there will be 
something down the road.  Just like the internet has, in many respects, 
replaced telephony, in ways that 50 years ago we didn’t know would happen.  
Fifty years from now we suspect that DNS or something else like that will be 
different.  Now at least we want to make sure that there is a free opportunity.  
And part of the cost of having ICANN or any other organization become that 
international organization that governments then control, is highly 
undesirable because governments by nature are extraordinarily conservative.  
Then they will then enshrine the current system and the current set of 
relationships in ways that then have impact that make it extraordinarily 
hard for the next best thing to come along and do something. 
 
I wanted to get back to an issue that Esther raised.  One of the original 
dreams of ICANN and the internet governance process was some hope that 
perhaps, by going around territorial government or creating some 
alternative, that ICANN or internet governance might be an alternative to 
the United Nations and the ITU. So, the question I have, is there anything 
left of that internet dream?  Have we learned a way for a coordinating 
organization to represent people independent of government? 
 
E:  The best way to describe cynicism is as the disappointment of the 
idealist.  A government has an interesting challenge because it needs to 
govern everyone and be accountable to everyone.  A private sector 
organization can arbitrarily decide whom it wants to deal with; it can say. 
“You’re too much of a trouble maker; we don’t want you in our store, in our 
organization, whatever.”  ICANN had an even more difficult problem because 
it wasn’t really clear who was in its store.  It kept foundering on the notion of 
representative democracy and voting. Of course, people who wanted to be 
influential could round up the digital troops.  They  may or may not have 





E:  Yes, the elections. 
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For people who don’t follow this, ICANN made an effort in its earlier 
days to have global elections. To have elections for the whole world, 
independent from any sort of government, so it was an experiment in global 
democracy. 
 
E:  Yes, it got about 100,000 votes as I recall.  It was riddled with 
problems, and conspiracy theories abounded.  The things you’re finding, 
they’re great examples of governance on the internet, but they’re governance 
on the internet; they’re not governance by the internet.   
 
That is,  you can be arbitrary if you’re not a sovereign government.  
You can have rules in a particular online community, and you can have rules 
for changing those rules that aren’t voted upon; if you don’t like the rules, you 
can go somewhere else.   
 
So, there are great models for governance on the internet but they 
don’t really apply to governance of the Internet.  They could apply to ICANN, 
and you can argue they should apply to ICANN, if there were credible 
alternatives.  But precisely because there is no credible alternative to 
ICANN,  it has a duty, to be more accountable and more procedure-ridden 
than might be appropriate.  But I think it goes  way, way too far in that 
direction. The best thing that could happen for ICANN would be some 
lightening up of its  rules; that might improve things.   
 
The other challenge is dealing with some of the mess on the 
commercial side of ICANN. I’m not talking about people living off ICANN, 
but the whole domain name business, the association of easy-to-get domain 
names with criminals who run phishing websites and stuff like that have 
turned this thing into a cesspool. 
 
M:  I’d give a somewhat different answer, because I think that there 
was more than one dream that sort of combined together.  One was the 
dream of a sort of spontaneous, self-governance.  And we do see that for 
things that are purely on the internet like the IETF.  I wrote a big paper 
arguing that it was as close to having an ideal discourse as you were ever 
going to see in real life.  And that it was also hothouse conditions, where you 
had people with similar interests, they had an economic interest in there 
being an answer and it’s not something that’s easy to replicate outside.  I 
would say that we also have some of the dream alive for the use of IT to help 
national politics. I mean You Tube and blogs and the whole discourse that’s 
happening here and in other countries, which is a very exciting development.  
That wasn’t ICANN ever.  ICANN became very quickly, an economic fight 
over board votes: that went by fast.  But, there was a different dream that 
hasn’t been mentioned and that was the public/private cooperative dream 
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which I sometimes call vulgar corporatism. It was a dream dreamt by people 
who weren’t really familiar with that history of attempts of corporatism and 
didn’t try to design around the problem and therefore fell into the known 
traps.  I’m very happy to say that if anything good came out of ICANN, we 
killed that. 
 
Do we need internet governance at all?  Is it possible to imagine an 
outcome where we just think back to the 1990s or 2000s and say well, at one 
point, this was all thought to be necessary, but turned out not not be.  After 
all, we don’t have anyone really in charge of the World Wide Web so do we 
really need someone in charge of internet naming and numbering? 
 
E:  We need rules, yes.  And again I think that the best system is 
where rule sets compete.  Right now we have a system where it’s a single rule 
set and a single group of individuals in charge.  Perhaps one of the things 
most unstable about ICANN now is the individuals who are there, because 
they’re not immortal. 
 
They’re going to have to change at some point and it’s way more 
personal, in some sense, than it ought to be.  The original ideal of ICANN was 
a place where people would come together to argue about policies; the policies 
would be promulgated by consensus and then everyone would observe them.  
Those who  did not observe them would be banished from the system .  That 
actually is a pretty good idea. It’s just really, really hard to implement.  
 
Is the focus on issues of naming and numbering to the exclusion of 
more important issues of internet governance?  Is there anything you come 
across that might fall into that description? 
 
D:  The answer is, absolutely.  The rules of the road, not just over DNS, 
but its availability and the way in which individuals relate to the internet 
and are able to use it or not be able to use it, information flows become 
extremely important.  We saw this very clearly before Congress last year, as 
there was proposed legislation about  the appropriate role for U.S. companies 
in this space  in dealing with governments in countries that do not allow their 
people to have free access to information and the like.  I spend a lot of time, 
under Secretary Rice’s direction, with many colleagues working on what we 
call “internet freedom”, which is related to internet governance. This issue is 
about what the U.S. government can be doing on absent additional authority 
by Congress in this area, what tools do we have to promote this?  We have a 
number of very important tools that we are increasingly using.  
 
We do things, for example, in our State Department, congressionally 
mandated, Human Rights Report.  We now have specific sections that focus 
On the Future of Internet Governance 
 12 
on internet issues, which had not been true before.  We now ask all of our 
posts, when they’re providing the input for all of the countries in the world, to 
help report on what’s going on. What are the roles of government?  What are 
the laws, what are the regulations on the free-flow of information?  And then 
we talk about it.  Talking about it and reporting on it is obviously not enough, 
so  we spend time advocating about this.  I recognize, that I’m an extremist 
on this subject, and as Americans, we all are because of  our First 
Amendment.  Being an extremist and a bit of a subversive on these things is 
a very powerful tool for change, and we’ve got a very powerful story to tell.  
 
Having said that, it’s a very difficult story to tell effectively as an 
advocate.  How do you get China to liberalize? How do you get countries in 
the Middle East to liberalize?  How do you deal with issues such as cartoons 
of the prophet Mohammed, as they are transmitted over the internet, 
creating riots where people are killed?  How do you deal with those classes of 
issues in ways that allow, and give comfort to, people who want to allow 
greater freedom on the internet?  Those are important things and ones that 
we’re very actively discussing bilaterally, multilaterally and otherwise.  It’s a 
long process for many countries, it’s easier for others, but it’s clearly an 
important calling and one that we’re spending a lot of time on.   
 
And lastly, and perhaps most importantly in terms of internet 
governance, none of this stuff matters if people don’t have access to it.  And so 
we are spending an increasing amount of time, and my colleagues’ time, and 
effort and money on working with governments around the world trying to 
figure out ways we can expand the facilities over which the internet, whether 
it is wirelessly or wire line, fiber optics or satellite, so that people have access 
to it.  And so the important corollary to all of these interesting academic and 
legal debates, which are extraordinarily important, over internet governance, 
is that  it’s not much to do about anything unless we have a lot of people 
benefiting from it.  I’m extraordinarily thrilled to report, as many of you 
know, that there are now over 2 billion people who have access to wireless 
and wire line telephones, many of whom now have access to the internet 
through that medium, and over 1 billion subscribers to the internet itself. An 
extraordinary change and it also underscores why governments take these 
issues of internet governance so very, very seriously. 
 
Michael, do you have any thoughts on this? 
 
M:   I think we’re building structures that may change but there’s also 
some chance that they may last.  In that context, I think we all realize just 
how dangerous internet governance can be.  People want to solve the spam 
problem or maybe the porn problem, whatever they think the problem is, and 
legally and technically the power to do good is also the power to do great 
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harm. And when governance, the power to choose what will be valued and 
how that will be enforced is in the hands of a body that isn’t terribly 
legitimate, and which isn’t run in ways that any of us are terribly happy 
about, that might be one of the reasons you don’t want to empower it to do 
some of the good things you might like to see done, because it’s so easy to use 
those same powers to do very bad things which are very hard to undo. That’s 
why I’ve proposed breaking ICANN up into pieces, partly because the more 
powers together make it more dangerous. 
 
Let’s say, in the interest of controlling child pornography, ICANN 
undertakes measures to more closely control who gets a domain name. 
 
M:  To make registrars enforcers. 
 
Right. That sounds like a good thing, so tell us what’s wrong about 
that? 
 
M:  Now we’ve institutionalized this idea that this odd body can make 
content-control decisions in a way in which aren’t reviewable, aren’t 
controllable, and yet makes decisions that are very enforceable and enlists 
other people to do things. 
 
E:  It makes the registrars into police. 
 
M:  Right.  Please don’t get me wrong, no one at ICANN has suggested 
that they are about to do that, I’m happy to say. 
 
E:  I want to go back to what David said, and talk about how important 
it is to think first about people just getting access to the Internet.  I don’t 
think it’s going to be done by the ITU,.  Is there anybody here from 
Kazakhstan?  [yes; a hand was raised]  Well,  we should talk because I was 
there in September and spent a fair amount of time talking with local  NGOs.  
One problem there is that internet access is extremely expensive.  It’s 
approximately $350 a month.  While I was there, it was revealed that the guy 
who runs Kazah Telecom, which is half owned by the state and half owned by 
other interests, makes $350,000 a month.  Nobody was shocked by this and 
they weren’t really talking about the amount.  What they were talking about 
is, “Gosh, I wonder who in the government caused this information to be 
revealed?” 
 
Of course, Kazak Telecom has a monopoly. When I was leaving, just by 
chance, I flew out next to the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, the guy who 
tried to shut down Borat.  Rather than engage him in a futile discussion on 
freedom of speech or anything like that, I said, “You know, it would really 
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help your economy, if you created, you don’t even need to create competition 
for Kazakh Telecom… If it just lowered its charges by 50%, it would probably 
more than double its revenues and become even more profitable.”  But of 
course there are a lot of people in the Kazakh establishment who aren’t 
particularly interested in providing access to lots of people more cheaply.  
That’s one of the big problems.  You go in there, and these people don’t even 
want this to happen because they’re making higher rents on the situation the 




Q:  My name is James Apple, I’m with the International Judicial 
Academy.  My question is to the panel:  What are the arguments against 
having something like the World Trade Organization, where you have a set of 
protocols and dispute resolution and a palate body and a whole system of 
trade disputes; what’s the argument doing that for the internet? 
 
T:   Do you mean having the WTO itself assert more authority over the 
internet, because I think that that is something that is going to happen. 
 
Q:  No.  That would be a possibility but the other would be to have a 
separate organization devoted to the internet; the WIO, the World Internet 
Organization. 
 
M:  I think that there are a huge number of problems with that, I’ll 
just mention two.  One is that, as a philosophical matter, I’m not ashamed to 
say that I do not want governments regulating my communication with you, 
and that would be an inevitable consequence of that structure and that 
makes me exceedingly uncomfortable.  The second is that the governance 
mechanisms of the WTO aren’t sufficient for the regulation of 
communications. 
 
T:   But the WTO does now, with the participation of various despotic 
governments, regulate your candy bar supplies or how you get your 
manufactured goods.  You go to Wal-mart and look at the goods, those are 
strongly affected by the WTO.  Does that bother you in the same way or is it a 
different issue? 
 
M:  I think communications are special, I think that it’s stronger for 
that category.  I think that in the WTO more reasonable people will disagree, 
for the internet, especially communications. When it touches politics and free 
speech and so on, I’m less willing to concede that aspect of it.  And the next is 
the problem of how you allocate decision making power either for policy 
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making or how these arbitrations would work is so non-trivial as to … no-
one’s come forward with anything that even looks like a solution. 
 
Q:  Well, thank you.  David Jeffrey, I’m from the United Nations, very 
much in a personal capacity; long time listener, first time caller.  My first 
attendance at this meeting and thank you for taking my call.  My question is, 
I find the topic of future International Law a bit too daunting, what about 
present International Law.  What can we currently say about the role of 
International Law and, in your wildest dreams, what might it be called upon 
to do in the future? 
 
T:   I would say the role of treaties right now, in the regulation of the 
internet, is fairly minimal, though not non-existent.  For you can count on 
one hand the number of treaties that are relevant to the current affairs of the 
internet.   If this was an exam question, name all of the international laws 
that matter, I guess I would point to the telecommunications agreements.  
Particularly the ones that were assigned in the foundation of the WTO and 
various inter-connection requirements, you have to connect on this, the 
carriers are supposed to connect with each-other, as something that is kind of 
relevant in the sense that the pipes have to connect and there has to be a 
connection between the wires, the same way your airplane has to land.  But, 
beyond that… 
  
M:  I think that framing the question in terms of treaties leaves out 
important…I’m talking about classic International Law too, for example the 
intellectual property area.  There are a lot of things under the general 
umbrella existing harmonizing rules for copyright and trademark for 
example, which gets supplied too.  Anyway, there’s an ongoing attempt by 
WIPO to insert itself as a maker of a unique, global legitimate trademark law 
for domain names. There is transporter, transaction rules all kinds being 
negotiated bi-laterally, especially in the EU, there’s data protection rules, 
etc., etc. There’s comity questions, the yahoos…a whole chapter in your 
book…so I would say that there’s tons and tons of it, just like anything else 
that’s important.  The fact that we don’t have treaties for it, for many of the 
reasons that you say in the book, gets rolled up under familiar umbrellas and 
gets….  I used to say I was an internet lawyer and it’s very hard to say that 
with a straight face anymore because it’s now a sub-field of everything else. 
 
T:   That’s true.  Its also true that every time you click on a webpage of 
another country, it’s also an export and import of service, and people haven’t 
fully thought through and no one’s really litigated or tried out what happens 
when you start  thinking  of every incidence of internet communications as a 
trade in service.  But if I were to guess to what area might develop as 
international regulations of the internet, I would put my bet on the WTO. 
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That’s all of our time.  Thanks to everyone for attending and 
participating, and thanks the American Society of International Law 
conference organizers for placing this panel on the agenda of the meeting. 
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